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A series of studies in experimental philosophy have revealed that people
blame others for foreseen negative side effects but do not praise them for
foreseen positive ones. In order to challenge this idea, also called the Knobe
effect, we develop a laboratory experiment using monetary incentives. In a
game-theoretic framework we formalize the two vignettes in a neutral way,
which means that we abstain from the use of any specific language terms
and can easily control and vary the economic parameters of the situation.
We confirm the Knobe effect in one situation and present situations in which
the effect vanishes or even reverses. Our results are in line with a theoretical
approach where the assessment of intention is not based on the action itself
but on the underlying motive – as modelled in Levine (1998).
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1. INTRODUCTION
If a firm produces a negative externality, it is blamed for it and it often
causes a storm of protest. For instance, when Shell planned to sink its
oil storage platform Brent Spar, public and political opposition resulted.
There exist many examples for positive externalities as a side effect of
payoff maximization too. A poetic example is the case of the honey
producer, but knowledge spillovers are also abundant. In contrast to
negative externalities it is, however, difficult to find examples that show
reward in response to these positive externalities. This asymmetry has
been confirmed by the experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe (2003)
who conducted a questionnaire study in which subjects could attribute
intentions to the producer of positive and negative side effects. He finds
that ‘people are considerably more willing to blame [ . . . ] for bad side
effects than to praise the agent for good side effect’. In his questionnaire
study he uses the following two vignettes.
Knobe HARM story
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board
and said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new programme. It will help us
increase profits, but it will also harm the environment.’ The chairman of
the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about harming the environment. I
just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new programme.’
They started the new programme, the company increased its profits and
the environment was harmed. Question: Did the chairman of the board
intentionally harm the environment?
Knobe HELP story
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board
and said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new programme. It will help us
increase profits, and it will also help the environment.’ The chairman of
the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about helping the environment. I
just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new programme.’
They started the new programme, the company increased its profits and
the environment was helped. Question: Did the chairman of the board
intentionally help the environment?
These two stories are almost identical; only the word but was
replaced by the word and, and the word harm was replaced by the word
help. Seventy-eight people in a Manhattan public park were randomly
given one of the two questions. Eighty-two per cent of subjects who
had to answer the HARM question said the chairman harmed the
environment intentionally but only 23% of subjects who had to answer
the HELP question claimed that the chairman helped the environment
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intentionally. Thus, a small change of words leads to a complete change
in peoples’ intuitions. In experimental philosophy this result is known as
the Knobe effect or side-effect effect. The Knobe effect turns out to be very
robust. It is stable with respect to framing (Adams and Steadman 2007;
Cushman 2007; Wright and Bengson 2009), age (Leslie et al. 2006), cultural
background (Knobe and Burra 2006) and order of presentation (Nichols
and Ulatowski 2008; Wright and Bengson 2009). Different attempts have
been taken to understand the underlying reasons for the asymmetry of
the Knobe effect and the structure of the attribution of intention. Knobe
(2006) discusses concepts of intentional action. He finds that the moral
dimension of an action is crucial for the perception of intention. Also,
he finds that helping can be perceived as intentional if it is considered
as morally good. A crucial conclusion ‘is that people’s judgment that
the behaviour itself is bad can influence their intuitions as to whether
the behaviour was performed intentionally and that these intuitions
can, in turn, play an important role in the process by which people
determine whether or not to assign blame’ (Knobe 2006: 219). Machery
(2008) investigates side effects that do not affect others. He confirms the
Knobe effect and suggests that trade-offs are decisive for whether people
attribute intention to a side effect. Mallon (2008) criticizes the trade-off
hypothesis of Machery and confirms the Knobe effect in situations in
which the main goal is to affect others.
Despite the ostensible robustness of the Knobe effect, the use of
the word ‘intentional’ is critical in all these studies. It is unclear what
people exactly mean when they use the word intentional. However, several
studies have shown that the Knobe effect also arises with the words being
the intention of (Knobe 2004; McCann 2005), desiring (Tannenbaum et al.
2007), deciding, in favour of, opposed to and advocating (Pettit and Knobe
2009). In order to study the Knobe effect in a language independent way,
we translate the two situations of the Knobe questions into a game and
conduct a laboratory experiment using monetary incentives. Subjects are
the role of the chairman, the environment and the third party who assesses
the behaviour of the chairman. The economic incentives are constructed
in a way that the chairman can choose whether or not to produce a side
effect, which affects the person in the role of the environment. In order
to measure the assessment of the third party, we give this person the
possibility to reward and punish the originator of the side effect. We use
these decisions as a measure for praise and blame for the action. Our use
of praise and blame in order to study people’s attribution of intention is
based on three arguments.
First, the experimental evidence shows that people care about
intentions by rewarding and punishing. In the experimental economics
literature there is much evidence that people punish negative intentions
(Blount 1995; Brandts and Sola 2001; Charness and Rabin 2002; Nelson Jr.
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2002; Offerman 2002; Falk et al. 2003; Charness 2004; Charness and Rabin
2005; Charness and Levine 2007; Falk et al. 2008) and that people reward
good intentions (Charness and Levine 2007; Falk et al. 2008).1 Our design
uses this evidence. We employ peoples’ punishment and reward decisions
to infer their praise and blame judgements.
Second, we relate blame and praise to game-theoretical concepts of
intention (e.g. Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and
Fischbacher 2006). We suggest a concept of intention that is based on
the underlying motive that drives the action. We investigate this concept
in situations in which the side effect affects the well-being of others. In
these situations we assume a selfish motive and a – positive or negative –
concern for others as in the model of Levine (1998). In this model an action
is considered as intentionally bad if it is caused with a bad intention, i.e.
if it is caused based on a bad motive. Analogously, an action is considered
as intentionally good if it is caused with a good intention, i.e. if it is
caused based on a good motive. Thus, in this model, the assessment of
intention is not based on the action itself but on the underlying motive.
This can capture how people interpret the intention question in Knobe’s
questionnaire because the question is not whether it was intentional to
perform the action but whether it was intentional to create the side effect.
Therefore we have to address the question whether people wanted to
cause this side effect, i.e. whether the side effect is relevant for the decision.
Although many people may care about the side effect, they might differ
in how much they care about it, i.e. there are different types. In the harm
condition there are some people who do not care about the side effect
but there are some who care about the side effect and would not start the
programme. This means that we can conclude that those who started the
project had the intention to refrain from protecting the environment. More
generally, if people differ in how much they care about the environment,
we can infer their type from their action.
Third, we can use the experimental findings to identify potential
situations where the Knobe effect is present, disappears or reverses and
test them in a questionnaire.
Thus, in this paper, we take four steps. First, we translate the Knobe
questionnaire into language-independent incentivized games. Second, we
measure blame and praise using punishment and reward. We confirm
the Knobe effect in one situation and present situations in which the
effect vanishes or even reverses. Third, we relate reward and punishment
1 With respect to the role of intentions when positive outcomes can be rewarded, Offerman
(2002), Cox and Deck (2005), Bolton et al. (1998), and Houser et al. (2008) do not find an
effect. However, this finding might just confirm the Knobe effect. A possible explanation
is that people might not reward positive externalities because the producer’s motivation
could be instrumental.
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patterns to the theoretical intention concept based on Levine (1998)
outlined above. Fourth, we retranslate one experimental game into a
questionnaire and generate a vignette in which the Knobe effect vanishes.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Part, we present the
experimental design and procedure. In Part 3 we describe our hypotheses.
Experimental results are given in Part 4. Part 5 presents design and
procedure of our questionnaire study. Part 6 presents the questionnaire
results. Part 7 discusses and concludes.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
In order to challenge Knobe’s claim that people are willing to blame others
for negative foreseen side effects, but are not willing to praise them for
positive ones, we use the following basic three player game. Player 1 (who
corresponds to the chairman of the board) has to choose between two
allocations X and Y. We frame allocation X as default and give player 1 the
option to change to allocation Y. The default X represents the firm’s and
environment’s situation at the time when vice-president and chairman of
the board are talking in their office.Y represents the situation after the start
of the programme. As we are interested in whether people are influenced
by the caused side effects, we control for other possible influences and use
the same allocation Y for both kinds of side effects. The games differ only
in the default allocation X.
A third player, player 3, takes the role of the reader of the story. He
is not involved in player 1’s decision. After learning player 1’s choice,
player 3 is free to transfer points from player 1 to player 2 or the other
way around. This transfer is costless for player 3, since we are interested
in all participants’ assessments of intentionality and not only in the non-
selfish participants’ transfer. Player 3 receives an endowment of 100 points
independent of player 1’s decision. Therefore, player 3’s decision is not
affected by envy or fear of retribution. By this means we ensure that player
3’s decisions accurately reflect his praise and blame judgements.
Since the Knobe questions neither provide information on specific
losses and gains for the firm and the environment, nor on their relative
endowments, the stories leave it to the participant to form a view of
the situation. With our design we introduce three concrete and precisely
defined settings how readers might perceive and understand the story.
We vary the relative endowments of the active player 1 and the passive
player 2 as well as the strength of the positive externality. We keep the
strength of the negative externality constant across all three settings.
The setting StrongActiveSmallHelp corresponds to how we think most
people understand the story. A strong active agent affects a weak
passive one. Harming really harms and helping helps only weakly. We
use StrongActiveSmallHelp in order to confirm the Knobe effect in the
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Endowment after
Default X change Y
Setting Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2
StrongActiveSmallHelp Harm 50 50 60 30
Help 50 20 60 30
No side - - 60 30
effect
WeakActiveSmallHelp Harm 20 80 30 60
Help 20 50 30 60
No side - - 30 60
effect
WeakActiveBigHelp Harm 20 80 30 60
Help 20 20 30 60
No side - - 30 60
effect
TABLE 1. Allocations in the three settings.
laboratory. In WeakActiveSmallHelp we switch the economic status of
the two agents. In this setting, a weak active agent affects a strong
passive one. The size of the side effects is as in StrongActiveSmallHelp. In
WeakActiveBigHelp we increase the size of the positive side effect. Harming
still harms, but helping now also really helps. Each setting consists of three
games: In the first game (harm) the allocation Y can be reached through
negative side effects. The second game (help) involves positive side effects
in order to reach Y. The third game (no side effect) does not include
any side effects. It is simply the allocation Y without any alternative as
control for player 3’s general inequality aversion. We now explain the
parameters of the three settings in detail, which are listed in Table 1. In
StrongActiveSmallHelp player 1 is in an economically stronger position
than player 2. The endowment after the change is 60 points for player
1, compared with 30 points for player 2. In the help as well as in the
harm condition, player 1 gains 10 points from causing the side effect. In
the harm condition, he causes a rather large damage of 20 points; in the
helping condition, he increases player 2’s income by only 10 points.
In all questionnaire studies conducted so far, such as Knobe (2003),
Leslie et al. (2006), Mallon (2008), Machery (2008) or Wright and Bengson
(2009), the producer of the externality holds the higher economic status.
In order to test whether this is the underlying reason for the Knobe
effect, we switch the economic status of the agents in the settings
WeakActiveSmallHelp and WeakActiveBigHelp. In these settings player 1 is
in an economically weaker position than player 2. The endowment after
the change is 30 points for player 1, compared with 60 points for player
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2. As in StrongActiveSmallHelp, player 1 gains 10 points from causing the
positive side effect, and in the harm condition, the damage equals 20
points. The two settings differ in the extent of the positive externality. In
WeakActiveSmallHelp, helping increases player 2’s income by 10 points –
as in the setting StrongActiveSmallHelp. In the setting WeakActiveBigHelp,
helping increases player 2’s income by 40 points.
There are three main advantages of our design. First, as pointed
out above, using monetarily incentivized decisions allows us to model
many different settings without the use of language. Second, we use
a technology similar to Croson and Konow (2009) that allows a direct
comparison between reward and punishment. Many studies analyse only
one kind of targeted interaction – either reward or punishment. In these
studies both reward and punishment are costly (e.g. Bolton et al. 1998;
Offerman 2002; Charness and Levine 2007; Falk et al. 2008; Rand et al.
2009). Therefore, punishment is efficiency reducing, while reward is not.
This means that effects cannot be directly compared and punishment
and reward must be treated separately. Our approach enables us to
perfectly compare reward and punishment. Since reward and punishment
are costless for the punisher, punishment is equivalent to withholding
reward and vice versa. Thus, we get a clean direct comparison of positive
and negative reciprocity. In this way, we are able to bring experimental
philosophy into the laboratory and test subjects’ behaviour in a controlled
environment with real monetary consequences. Third, with the treatment
‘no side effect’ we control for inequality aversion.
2.1 Procedure
We conducted 8 sessions in the time between January and June 2009. All
sessions were conducted at the LakeLab (TWI/University of Konstanz)
with a total number of 180 participants (60 subjects each of type 1, 2
and 3). None of the subjects participated in more than one session. Three
sessions consisted of StrongActiveSmallHelp and WeakActiveSmallHelp and
five sessions included StrongActiveSmallHelp and WeakActiveBigHelp. This
means all participants were in the setting StrongActiveSmallHelp, 75 of
them were additionally in setting WeakActiveSmallHelp and the remaining
105 subjects were additionally in setting WeakActiveBigHelp. Every setting
consists of three games. Therefore, every player 1 made four decisions
(since he did not have to take a decision in the no side effect games)
and every player 3 made six decisions.2 Before the experiment started,
subjects were randomly assigned to their role as player 1, 2 or 3. Each
subject sat at a randomly assigned PC terminal and was given a copy
2 Every player 3 received both no side effect games in order to control for possible presentation
effects.
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of instructions.3 A set of control questions was provided to ensure the
understanding of the game. The experiment did not start until all subjects
had answered all questions correctly. We use a within-subject design in
order to be able to distinguish inequality aversion from punishment and
reward. In every game, players were rematched, and they played the
games in randomized order. The ‘no side effect’ games were played after
the other games at the end of the experiment. Subjects did not receive
feedback until the end of their sixth game in order to avoid learning. For
each game player 1 and 2 received the payoff from the allocation and
the points assigned by player 3. Player 3 received 100 points for every
game. For player 3 we use the strategy method. That means, without
knowing player 1’s decision, player 3 redistributes points for both possible
decisions.4 One point was converted into 0.01 euros. The experiment took
about 30 minutes, average income of a participant was 3.77 euros ($4.87).
This experiment was conducted after another unrelated experiment.5




TABLE 2. Number of players 3 across
settings.
3. HYPOTHESES
In this section, we analyse the theoretical predictions for player 3’s
decisions when allocation Y has been chosen (in the Knobe questions:
when the programme has been started). In each setting, this allocation
is the same for the three games. Thus, we can compare player 3’s
redistribution in the case when the outcome resulted from player 1
helping or harming or when player 1 had no impact at all. The Knobe
3 Instructions can be found in the Appendix.
4 The use of the strategy method (Selten 1967) is still controversial. The strategy method and
the direct response method sometimes yield different results, as in Schotter et al. (1994),
Güth et al. (2001), Kübler and Müller (2002), Neugebauer et al. (2008), Brosig et al. (2003),
or Solnick (2007), and sometimes yield similar results. See for example Cason and Mui
(1998), Brandts and Charness (2000), McLeish and Oxoby (2004), Cox and Deck (2005),
Falk and Kosfeld (2006). Charness and Levine (2007) state that the strategy method can be
problematic in experiments where the level of the observed variable is important. Since in
our experiment we consider changes in the rate of punishment and reward rather than the
level of the rate the strategy method should be innocuous.
5 Fischbacher and Schudy (forthcoming).
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effect describes that participants are more willing to blame other people
for negative foreseen side effects than to praise them for positive
ones. In our experiment we measure praise and blame via reward and
punishment. If player 3 assigns fewer points to player 1 in the harming
game than in the game with no side effects we define it as punishment.
If player 3 assigns more points to player 1 in the helping game than
in the game with no side effects we define it as reward. If the Knobe
effect persists in our experimental economic framework we should expect
that player 3 punishes player 1 for negative side effects but does not
reward him for positive ones. Therefore, the absolute difference between
the amount of transferred points to player 1 after a decision including
negative side effects and the game with no side effects included should
be higher than the absolute difference between the amount of transferred
points to player 1 after a decision including positive side effects and the
game with no side effects. Reward and punishment should not differ
across settings. This is captured in Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 (Knobe Hypothesis)
Punishment after harming is higher than reward after helping in all three
settings.
Based on the behavioural evidence, various economic theories have been
developed in which intentions are modelled. In the models of Rabin
(1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher
(2006) intentional kindness or unkindness is inferred from which choice
has been made – taking into account the available alternatives. In
the model of Rabin and, similarly in the model of Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger, the kindness of an action depends on the payoff that results
for the other player. In the case of a dichotomous decision, the action
associated with the lower payoff is always considered as unkind. This
corresponds to the harm vignette. If the action yields a higher payoff for
the other player, its kindness depends also on the own payoff. The models
define the action as kind only if it decreases the own payoff. Otherwise,
the action is neither defined as kind nor unkind. This is the situation of the
help vignette. In these models causing the negative side effect is unkind
but causing the positive side effect is not kind. Thus, these models also
predict the Knobe effect.
A different approach has been taken by Levine (1998) who measures
the intention with the type of a player. In this model, people differ in
how they value the other players’ types and are rewarded and punished
based on their type. This weight can be positive, in which case the player
is altruistic, or negative, in which case he is spiteful. Since their type
is not known to the other players it has to be inferred from the action.
The game theoretical solution concept is the Bayesian equilibrium. Since
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there is often not a unique equilibrium, we empirically check whether
reward and punishment behaviour is consistent with the behaviour of the
players 1. According to the model of Levine, a kind action is the kinder the
fewer people choose this action, just because the kindest 10% are kinder
than the kindest 50%. This model predicts punishment for harming but
also reward for helping. The extent of reward and punishment depends
on the average kindness or unkindness of the players who have chosen
a particular action. This means that the more people make a particular
unkind decision, the less unkind is this decision on average. The more
people make a particular kind decision, the less friendly is this decision
on average. Thus, we can derive a specific hypothesis how the aggregate
behaviour of players 1 is related to reward and punishment.
Hypothesis 2 (Levine Hypotheses)
(a) The more players 1 choose to harm player 2, the less player
3 punishes.
(b) The more players 1 choose to help player 2, the less player 3 rewards.
Note, that this hypothesis does not necessarily predict the Knobe effect.
For example if few people create the positive externality, they would be
recognized as kind and rewarded.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We structure the results in the following way: First, we present the
experimental results focusing on player 3’s transfer decisions. Second, we
test the Knobe and Levine Hypotheses. Finally, we present the results of
the questionnaire studies. Details on statistical test results are given in the
Appendix.
We are interested in player 3’s decisions when allocation Y has been
chosen. For each setting there are three games with different side effects:
positive, negative and no side effects. Allocation Y stays the same for the
three games. Thus, we can easily compare player 3’s transfer depending
on positive side effects, negative side effects or no side effects.
Figure 1 shows the transfer of player 3 from player 1 to player 2
for all settings. If player 3 cares for equality of allocations, we should
expect that he redistributes points from the richer to the poorer. In order
to equalize payoffs, player 3 would have to transfer 15 points. These 15
points hold for a benchmark and are given by the variable equality. No
side effect shows the transferred points for the control game without side
effect. Transferred points from player 2 to player 1 in the harm and help
condition are given in negative and positive side effect, respectively. In all
games with no side effect, participants use the redistribution to reduce
inequality. Payoffs after redistribution do not significantly differ from
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FIGURE 1. Transfer to player 1 from player 2 by player 3
equality. This is consistent with behaviour induced by inequality aversion.
Also in the games with side effect, player 3 reduces inequality. However,
his transfer differs between the different situations. We discuss in the next
section how exactly side effects affect the participants’ transfer decision.
4.1 Knobe Hypothesis
The Knobe effect describes the effect that people blame others for negative
side effects but do not praise them for positive ones. In our experiment we
measure blame and praise by reward and punishment. We compare player
3’s monetary transfers for agents having caused a side effect with transfers
for agents having caused no side effect. If player 3 assigns fewer points to
player 1 in the harming game than in the game with no side effects we
define that as punishment. If player 3 assigns more points to player 1 in
the helping game than in the game with no side effects we define this as
reward.
Punishment and reward are therefore independent from inequality
aversion. To simplify the analysis we define the variable net transfer as
transferred points from player 2 to player 1 minus transferred points in
the control game no side effect. Figure 2 shows the net transfer of player 3
from player 1 to player 2 for all settings. We now discuss the three settings.
Setting StrongActiveSmallHelp. Players 3 punish player 1 for a harming
side effect. However, they only slightly reward them for a helping side
effect. We find significant differences for net transfer between the games
with negative and positive side effect. That shows that subjects react more
strongly to negative than to positive side effect. To summarize: If the active
agent holds the higher economic status and the positive side effect is
relatively small, participants do not reward others for positive side effect
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FIGURE 2. Net transfer to player 1 by player 3. Net transfer = transferred points
from player 2 to player 1 after an externality minus transferred points in the
control game no side effect.
but punish them for a negative one. This confirms the Knobe effect for this
setting.
Setting WeakActiveSmallHelp. We do not find that side effects matter in
WeakActiveSmallHelp. Subjects do not punish the producer of negative
side effects nor do they reward the producer of positive ones. An active
agent with lower economic status leads the third parties to ignore all
side effects. The agents’ economic status essentially affects the appearance
of the Knobe effect. When the producer of the externality holds the
lower economic status, participants neither punish him for negative
side effects nor do they reward him for positive ones. The results of
WeakActiveSmallHelp also give evidence that the efficiency loss in the harm
game is not the driving force behind the Knobe effect. The efficiency loss
is still present. However, the Knobe effect has vanished.
Setting WeakActiveBigHelp. We used the additional setting WeakActive-
BigHelp in order to test how people’s willingness to reward and punish
foreseen side effects depends on the size of the positive side effects.
We find that subjects do not punish player 1 for negative side effects
in WeakActiveBigHelp. However, subjects do reward others for caused
positive side effects. We also find significant differences in net transfer
between the games with positive and negative side effects. These findings
reverse the Knobe effect. When the positive side effect is sufficiently large
and the producer of the externality holds the lower economic status,
participants reward others for positive side effects but do not punish them
for negative ones.
To summarize, we can replicate the Knobe effect in the laboratory,
but we also found situations where the Knobe effect does not exist. The
Knobe effect seems only to arise in situations where the producer of the
side effect holds the higher economic status and the positive side effect
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is small. Switching economic status makes the Knobe effect vanish. The
Knobe effect is even reversed in a setting with large positive side effects.
So we cannot confirm the Knobe Hypotheses. In the following section we
are going to test the Levine Hypotheses.
4.2 Levine Hypotheses
The model of Levine (1998) predicts punishment after harming but also
reward after helping. Concretely, the more people take a particular unkind
decision the lower the punishment is for this decision. The more people
take a particular kind decision the lower the reward is for this decision.
In this section we compare our results with these theoretical predictions
by Levine. Following Levine we should expect that punishment for a
negative externality and reward for a positive externality is negatively
correlated with the share of players 1 producing this externality.
This is exactly what we find. The more players 1 choose to harm or to
help, the less they are punished or rewarded, respectively. We find that it
is not the harming or helping side effect per se that makes people judge
whether a person was acting intentionally and is therefore to blame or to
praise. It is rather the relative (un)friendliness of an action. Our findings
are in line with Levine’s predictions and confirm Hypotheses 2a and 2b.
Punishment and reward significantly depend on the fraction of players 1
who choose to harm or reward. See the Appendix for statistical details.
5. DESIGN OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE-STUDY AND PROCEDURE
In order to close the circle and return to experimental philosophy, all 180
participants were asked to answer both Knobe questions at the end of
the experiment.6 Participants received the questions in randomized order.
The answers to the questionnaire studies had no consequences on the
participants’ payoff. Additionally, we conducted a second and a third
questionnaire study. Each of these two questionnaires studies contained
two stories similar to the Knobe stories.
In the original Knobe questions participants are informed about the
chairman’s interest in the environment. This information is not available
in the experiment. If participants do not explicitly receive this information,
they might nevertheless have an intuition about the interest of the other
player and this could affect results. Thus, in order to make the experiment
and the questionnaire comparable, we had two options, an additional
experiment or an additional questionnaire. We decided for the second and
much easier option: An additional questionnaire study where people were
not informed that the agent ‘doesn’t care at all’. In order to prove that the
6 Note that in our version of the Knobe questions only the word harm was replaced by the
word help. We did not change but into and.
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Knobe effect and our results do not depend on this statement, we adapt
the stories in the following way.
Knobe (no statement) HARM story
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board
and said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new programme. It will help us
increase profits, but it will also harm the environment.’ The chairman of
the board answered, ‘Let’s start the new programme.’ They started the
new programme, the company increased its profits and the environment
was harmed. Question: Did the chairman of the board intentionally harm
the environment?
Knobe (no statement) HELP story
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board
and said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new programme. It will help us
increase profits, but it will also help the environment.’ The chairman of
the board answered, ‘Let’s start the new programme.’ They started the
new programme, the company increased its profits and the environment
was helped. Question: Did the chairman of the board intentionally help
the environment?
In WeakActiveSmallHelp and WeakActiveBigHelp we analyse whether
the economic status of the agents is crucial for the Knobe effect. That is
why we also conduct an additional questionnaire study with a weak active
agent affecting a strong passive agent.
McDonald HARM story
The vice-president of a small fast-food restaurant went to the chairman
of the board and said, ‘We are thinking of launching a new burger. It
will help us increase profits, but it will also harm McDonald’s next door.’
The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about harming
McDonald’s. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s launch the
new burger.’ So the company launched the new burger, increased profits
and McDonald’s next door was harmed. Question: Did the chairman of
the board intentionally harm McDonald’s?
McDonald HELP story
The vice-president of a small fast-food restaurant went to the chairman of
the board and said, ‘We are thinking of launching a new burger. It will help
us increase profits, but it will also help McDonald’s next door (for example
due to higher pedestrian flow).’ The chairman of the board answered, ‘I
don’t care at all about helping McDonald’s. I just want to make as much
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Knobe HARM harmed intentionally 16% 48% 64%
harmed not intentionally 6% 30% 36%
Total 22% 78%
TABLE 3. Percentage of participants who state intentionality in the Knobe
questions.
profit as I can. Let’s launch the new burger.’ So the company launched
the new burger, increased profits and McDonald’s next door was helped.
Question: Did the chairman of the board intentionally help McDonald’s?
We presented the Knobe (no statement) HARM/HELP stories to 82
subjects at the LakeLab (TWI/University of Konstanz). The McDonald
HARM/HELP stories were presented to 63 subjects at the LakeLab and to
34 students at the University of Zurich. Participants received the questions
in randomized order with no apparent order effects. The experiment and
the questionnaires were programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). We
recruited participants using the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner
2004).
6. RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRES
The results of the last sections show that the economic status of the
agent causing an externality is a crucial determinant of the Knobe effect.
For the sake of completeness we verify this result by conducting three
additional questionnaire-studies. The first study contains the two original
Knobe questions. In the second study we modify the original stories by
eliminating the part: ‘I don’t care at all about harming the environment.
I just want to make as much profit as I can.’ We control whether our
experimental results depend on the missing statement on the chairman’s
attitude to the environment since our experiment did not include this
statement of the chairman on not caring about the environment. In the
third questionnaire study we modify the original stories by switching the
economic status of the agents.
We present the results of the Knobe HARM/HELP questions in
Table 3. They reflect Knobe’s original results. Sixty-four per cent of the 180
participants state that the firm intentionally harmed the environment, but
only 22% think that the firm intentionally helped the environment. This
difference is significant. On the basis of a within-subject comparison, we
find that 48% of the participants think that the firm intentionally harmed
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267114000170
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 11:33:12, subject to the Cambridge Core
230 VERENA UTIKAL AND URS FISCHBACHER
Knobe (no statement) HELP
helped helped not
intentionally intentionally total
Knobe (no statement) harmed intentionally 22% 44% 66%
HARM harmed not 2% 32% 34%
intentionally
Total 24% 76%





McDonald HARM harmed intentionally 9% 18% 27%
Story harmed not 6% 67% 73%
intentionally
Total 15% 85%
TABLE 5. Percentage of participants who state intentionality in the
McDonald questions.
but did not intentionally help the environment. Six per cent of the subjects
state that the firm intentionally helped but did not intentionally harm
the environment. Thirty per cent and 16% say that the firm harmed and
helped intentionally or did not harm and help intentionally, respectively.7
As in StongActiveSmallPositive we confirm the Knobe effect.
We also confirm the Knobe effect in the Knobe (no statement)
HARM/HELP questions. Table 4 shows that 66% of the 82 participants
think that the firm intentionally harmed the environment. Only 24% think
that the chairman intentionally helped the environment. This difference is
significant. These results are not statistically different from the results of
the original Knobe questions. We therefore conclude that behaviour does
not depend on the missing statement on the chairman’s attitude to the
environment.
The results of the McDonald HARM/HELP questions are presented in
Table 5.8 The share of the 97 participants saying that the firm intentionally
helped McDonald’s (15%) does not differ from the share of participants
(22%) that stated intentionality in the original Knobe helping vignette.
7 Subjects received the questions in random order with no apparent order effects.
8 There are no apparent order- or subject-pool effects.
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However, there is a significant decrease in the share of people thinking
that the firm intentionally harmed McDonald’s (27%) compared with the
share in the original Knobe harming vignette (64%). As in the experiment,
the perception of negative intentionality depends on the active agent’s
economic status.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper uses experimental economic tools to approach a problem
intensively discussed in the philosophical literature. We analyse the
economic determinants of situations in which the Knobe effect arises.
Knobe (2003) states that ‘people are considerably more willing to blame
( . . . ) for bad side effects than to praise ( . . . ) for good side effects’. This
paper analyses this asymmetric behaviour and tests the stability of the
Knobe effect. We use an experiment with monetary incentives to test for
its robustness. Our design abstains from the use of any specific language
terms and formalizes the two original Knobe vignettes in a neutral way
according to game theoretical structure. This means our design does
not imply a particular frame with respect to language terms. Instead, it
provides a specific frame with respect to the economic parameters of the
situations. While the original vignettes leave it to the readers to form
a specific view of the situation, our design gives the participants direct
specifications of the situation. We use monetary incentives in different
settings varying the economic status of the agents and the size of the side
effects.
Using monetary incentives instead of setting up hypothetical
situations in a questionnaire has four main advantages. First, the games
can be formulated in a neutral frame. Words like intentional, chairman,
company, harm or help do not appear. Second, since the incentives form
a game, game theoretic methods and concepts can be used to analyse
the effect. In particular, different theoretical models can be applied to the
situations. So, the Knobe effect can also contribute to our understanding
of social preferences. Third, we can control the economic parameters of
the situation. The original vignettes do not indicate any details on the
agents’ economic status nor the extent of the side effects and, therefore,
leave it to the participant to form a view of the situation. Since we translate
the Knobe vignettes into a concrete economic situation we control for
this view. In particular, we control the economic status of the involved
parties and the extent of the externality. Fourth, we can vary the economic
parameters to test the robustness of the effect. Since all questionnaires
conducted so far neglected the relative economic status of the agents and
the specification of the size of side effects, we use three different settings
in which we focus on these variables. By analysing the impact of crucial
economic determinants we investigate the stability and robustness of the
Knobe effect.
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Our study also makes a methodological contribution. So far studies
dealing with the Knobe effect used questionnaires to elicit people’s
intuitions on intentionality. In this study, we use a laboratory experiment
with monetary incentives. This means that people’s decisions are not
hypothetical but have a direct consequence on others. We use reward
and punishment as proxies for people’s judgement of praise and blame
for producers of positive and negative side effects. Although we cannot
prove that the perception of intention is identical to the assignment of
blame and praise, our results on blame and praise can help (and helped
us) to find situations in which the Knobe effect disappears or reverses.
Our approach provides a clean direct comparison of praise and blame,
since we use redistribution instead of costly reward and punishment. We
find the Knobe effect does not depend on language but on the economic
determinants of the situation such as economic status and the size of
the positive externality. The technology is of great use to future studies
dealing with praise and blame.
Our theoretical approach is based on Levine (1998). It assumes that
the more people show a particular bad behaviour, the more normal and
accepted this behaviour is in society. Thus, if people think that a specific
harming action is not morally wrong, most agents will commit this action.
According to this reasoning the more players choose to harm or help, the
less they are punished or rewarded, respectively. This concept is related to
Knobe (2006) who points out that for the perception of intention it matters
whether an action is perceived as morally wrong, and that a harming
action does not necessarily have to be morally wrong. The concept of
Levine (1998) gives us an empirical gradual measure about the morality
of a harming or helping action.
We find that it is not the harming or helping side effect per se that
makes people judge whether a person was acting intentionally and is
therefore to blame or to praise. It is rather the relative (un)friendliness
of an action. Or as Knobe (2006) suggests: ‘When people are wondering
whether or not a given behaviour was performed intentionally, they are
sometimes influenced by their beliefs about whether the behaviour itself
was good or bad.’
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settings equality No negative positive
StrongActiveSmallHelp −15 −14.68 −19.89 −13.75
WeakActiveSmallHelp 15 14.52 14.00 13.00
WeakActiveBigHelp 15 12.71 12.57 17.29
TABLE 6. Mean transfer to player 1 by player 3 when Y is chosen.
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N Wilcoxon signed rank test t-test
equality vs. no side effect 60 0.319 0.702
no side effect vs. negative 60 0.002 0.002
no side effect vs. positive 60 0.080 0.490
negative vs. positive 60 <0.001 <0.001
TABLE 7. p-values for StrongActiveSmallHelp.
N Wilcoxon signed rank test t-test
equality vs. no side effect 25 0.338 0.600
no side effect vs. negative 25 0.373 0.850
no side effect vs. positive 25 0.581 0.200
negative vs. positive 25 0.679 0.742
TABLE 8. p-values for WeakActiveSmallHelp.
N Wilcoxon signed rank test t-test
equality vs. no side effect 35 0.208 0.186
no side effect vs. negative 35 0.215 0.961
no side effect vs. positive 35 0.013 0.027
negative vs. positive 35 0.015 0.090
TABLE 9. p-values for WeakActiveBigHelp.
Levine Hypotheses
Table 10 shows the decisions of players 1. In Table 11 we report the results of
two regressions. We use the fraction of players 1 choosing Y as a predictor of







TABLE 10. Decisions of player 1.
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Games with negative Games with positive
side effects only side effects only
Fraction of players 1 choosing Y −18.52∗∗ (9.14) −40.34∗∗∗ (15.15)
Constant 15.11∗∗ (5.92) 35.01∗∗∗ (13.13)




Number of clusters 60 60
∗: p < 0.10, ∗∗: p < 0.05, ∗∗∗: p < 0.01.
TABLE 11. Regression with robust standard errors, clustered on subject.
Dependent variable: net transfer, i.e. punishment in first column and
reward in second column, standard errors in parentheses
punishment and reward. The first regression shows that punishment is indeed
negatively correlated with the share of people who choose the unkind allocation
Y. The second regression shows that reward is negatively correlated with the share
of people who choose the kind allocation Y.
8.2 Statistics – Questionnaires
Intentional HARM vs. intentional HELP N McNemar chi-square
Original Knobe 180 <0.001
Knobe (no statement) 82 <0.001
McDonald 97 0.053
TABLE 12. p-values.
Intentional HARM N z-test
Original Knobe vs. Knobe (no statement) 180+82 0.758
Original Knobe vs. McDonald 180+97 <0.001
TABLE 13. p-values.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267114000170
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 11:33:12, subject to the Cambridge Core
ATTRIBUTION OF EXTERNALITIES 237
Intentional HELP N z-test
Original Knobe vs. Knobe (no statement) 180+82 0.775
Original Knobe vs. McDonald 180+97 0.305
TABLE 14. 1 p-values.
8.3 Instructions – Player 1
There will now take place an additional experiment. In this experiment there
are players 1, players 2 and players 3. This experiment is not related to the first
experiment. The participants are rematched. A player A in the experiment can
now be a player 1, 2 or 3. Also the players B and C are now players 1, 2 or 3. You
are a player 1.
Also during this experiment we do not use euros but points. All points
you receive during the experiment will be changed into euros at the end of the
experiment: 100 points = 1 euro. The following pages give you instructions on
the course of the experiment. First, we are going to explain the basic situation.
After having read the instructions you are going to find some control questions on
the screen. The experiment will start as soon as all participants are familiar with
the experiment. THE EXPERIMENT: There are 6 decision situations. One group
contains one player 1, one player 2 and one player 3. For every decision round the
groups are going to be rematched. Before the decision starts, all participants learn
the initial situation. In the next step you can change this initial situation. After
your decision, player 3 can transfer points from you to player 2 or from player
2 to you. Player 2 does not have to make a decision. We are going to explain the
decision situation in the following example. EXAMPLE: You receive 30 points and
player 2 receives 50 points. You can keep this initial allocation or change it. If you
change it, you receive 10 points more, which is a total of 40 points. In this case
player 2 receives 20 points more, which is a total of 70 points. Player 2 does not
make a decision.
Player 1 (you) Player 2
Initial Situation 30 50
Change +10 +20
Situation after Change 40 70
At the beginning of every round, player 3 receives 100 points. After your decision
player 3 can transfer points from you to player 2 or from player 2 to you. For
example he can take away points from you in order to give them to player 2. Or
you can take away points from player 2 in order to give them to you. Assume you
keep the initial situation and player 3 transfers 5 points from player 2 to you. Then
the allocation looks like this:
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Player 1 (you) Player 2
40+5 = 45 70−5 = 65
Assume you change the initial situation and player 3 transfers 20 points from you
to player 2. Then the allocation looks like this:
player 1 (you) player 2
40−20 = 20 70+20 = 90
By now clicking on the OK button you will receive some control questions that
you can answer directly on screen.
8.4 Instructions – Player 2
There will now take place an additional experiment. In this experiment there
are players 1, players 2 and players 3. This experiment is not related to the first
experiment. The participants are rematched. A player A in the experiment can
now be a player 1, 2 or 3. Also the players B and C are now players 1, 2 or 3. You
are a player 2. Also during this experiment we do not use euros but points. All
points you receive during the experiment will be changed into euros at the end
of the experiment: 100 points = 1 euro. The following pages give you instructions
on the course of the experiment. First, we are going to explain the basic situation.
After having read the instructions you are going to find some control questions on
the screen. The experiment will start as soon as all participants are familiar with
the experiment. THE EXPERIMENT: There are 6 decision situations. One group
contains one player 1, one player 2 and one player 3. For every decision round
the groups are going to be rematched. Before the decision starts, all participants
learn the initial situation. In the next step player 1 can change this initial situation.
After player 1’s decision, player 3 can transfer points from you to player 1 or from
player 1 to you. You do not have to make a decision. We are going to explain the
decision situation in the following example:
EXAMPLE: player 1 receives 30 points and you receive 50 points. Player 1 can
keep this initial allocation or change it. If he changes it, player 1 receives 10 points
more, which is a total of 40 points. In this case you receive 20 points more, which
is a total of 70 points. You do not make a decision.
Player 1 Player 2 (you)
Initial Situation 30 50
Change +10 +20
Situation after Change 40 70
At the beginning of every round player 3 receives 100 points. After player 1’s
decision player 3 can transfer points from you to player 1 or from player 1 to you.
For example he can take away points from you in order to give them to player 1.
Or you can take away points from player 1 in order to give them to you.
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Assume player 1 keeps the initial situation and player 3 transfers 5 points from
you to player 1. Then the allocation looks like this:
Player 1 Player 2 (you)
40+5 = 45 70−5 = 65
Assume player 1 changes the initial situation and player 3 transfers 20 points from
player 1 to you. Then the allocation looks like this:
player 1 player 2 (you)
40−20 = 20 70+20 = 90
By now clicking on the OK button you will receive some control questions that
you can answer directly on screen.
8.5 Instructions – Player 3
There will now take place an additional experiment. In this experiment there
are players 1, player 2 and players 3. This experiment is not related to the first
experiment. The participants are rematched. A player A in the experiment can
now be a player 1, 2 or 3. Also the players B and C are now players 1, 2 or 3. You
are a player 3. Also during this experiment we do not use euros but points. All
points you receive during the experiment will be changed into euros at the end
of the experiment: 100 points = 1euro. The following pages give you instructions
on the course of the experiment. First, we are going to explain the basic situation.
After having read the instructions you are going to find some control questions on
the screen. The experiment will start as soon as all participants are familiar with
the experiment. THE EXPERIMENT: There are 6 decision situations. One group
contains one player 1, one player 2 and one player 3. For every decision round the
groups are going to be rematched. Before the decision starts, all participants learn
the initial situation. In the next step player 1 can change this initial situation. After
player 1’s decision, you can transfer points from player 1 to player 2 or from player
2 to player 1. Player 2 does not have to make a decision. We are going to explain
the decision situation in the following example. EXAMPLE: player 1 receives 30
points and player 2 receives 50 points, player 1 can keep this initial allocation or
change it. If he changes it, he receives 10 points more, which is a total of 40 points.
In this case player 2 receives 20 points more, which is a total of 70 points. Player 2
does not make a decision.
Player 1 Player 2
Initial Situation 30 50
Change +10 +20
Situation after Change 40 70
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At the beginning of every round, you being player 3, receive 100 points. After
player 1’s decision you can transfer points from player 1 to player 2 or from player
2 to player 1. For example you can take away points from player 1 in order to
give them to player 2. Or you can take away points from player 2 in order to
give them to player 1. You are going to make your decision before you know how
player 1 decides. That means you have to indicate your decision for both decision
possibilities of player 1. You therefore have to answer the following two questions:
Assume player 1 keeps the initial situation:
How many points do you want to transfer from player 1 to player 2?
How many points do you want to transfer from player 2 to player 1?
Assume player 1 changes the initial situation:
How many points do you want to transfer from player 1 to player 2?
How many points do you want to transfer from player 2 to player 1?
Please note: You can only transfer in one direction. That means you cannot transfer
points from player 1 to player 2 and transfer points from player 2 to player 1.
Assume player 1 keeps the initial situation and you transfer 5 points from player
2 to player 1. Then the allocation looks like this:
Player 1 Player 2
old 30 50
new 30+5 = 35 50−5 = 45
Assume player 1 changes the initial situation and you transfer 20 points from
player 1 to player 2. Then the allocation looks like this:
Player 1 Player 2
old 40 70
new 40−20 = 20 70+20 = 90
After your decision, you will see the new allocation for player 1 and 2 on your
screen. You then have the possibility to confirm or change your decision. In every
case you receive 100 points. By now clicking on the OK button you receive some
control questions that you can answer directly on screen.
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